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New Zealand
Jasper Krommendijk
tution and gender pay differences (CEDAW, 
1994; 1998b; 2003c; 2007c and 2012b).1
This article will examine whether the COs 
for New Zealand have been effective. It is 
part of a bigger PhD research on the effec-
tiveness of the process of reporting under the 
UN human rights treaties. New Zealand was 
chosen for this special issue about CEDAW, 
because the author wanted to examine 
whether COs have been effective in a coun-
try where one would expect them to lead to 
follow-up measures. The author considers 
New Zealand a most-likely case for effective-
ness for the following three reasons. Firstly, 
previous research showed that the process 
of state reporting has had the biggest impact 
in countries that have the bureaucratic and 
financial capacity to participate in the pro-
cess of state reporting and submit reports 
relatively on time, which are usually devel-
oped Western liberal democracies (Heyns & 
Viljoen, 2001, p. 488).2 Secondly, New Zea-
land is not a member of a regional (human 
rights) system. One reason why the impact 
and effectiveness of reporting under UN 
Human Rights Treaties, including CEDAW, 
was found to be limited for the Netherlands 
was the pervasiveness of EU and ECHR law. 
These regimes include binding obligations, 
which increasingly deal with gender equality 
issues or matters that affect women in partic-
ular, such as human trafficking and violence 
against women (Krommendijk, 2012a, p. 507). 
Thirdly, in New Zealand there is a separate 
Minister of Women’s Affairs supported by a 
small stand-alone Ministry (MWA)3 who co-
The Acting Minister for Women’s Affairs 
of New Zealand, te Heuhue, wrote in 2010: 
‘New Zealand has often been at the vanguard 
of women’s rights. (…) We routinely rank in 
the top half-dozen countries in the world 
when it comes to equality between women 
and men.’ (CEDAW, 2010, p. 4) Earlier, the 
Minister for Women’s Affairs Dalziel held 
that New Zealand needs to be a ‘credible 
voice internationally in women’s rights’ by 
giving leadership to other countries and be-
ing an example (Dalziel, 2007a). The imple-
mentation of women’s rights, as laid down in 
CEDAW, is monitored by the CEDAW Com-
mittee through a process of state reporting. 
All states party to CEDAW are required to 
submit periodically, at least every four years, 
a report on the measures adopted to give ef-
fect to the implementation of the treaty. Civil 
society and non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) are allowed to submit alterna-
tive information to the CEDAW Committee 
in shadow or parallel reports. These reports 
are examined through a so-called construc-
tive dialogue with representatives of the state 
party. This dialogue results in the adoption 
of legally non-binding Concluding Obser-
vations (COs), which contain suggestions 
and recommendations for an improved im-
plementation of CEDAW. The COs for New 
Zealand have dealt with, amongst others, the 
withdrawal of reservations concerning wom-
en in armed forces and the introduction of 
paid parental leave, the prevalence of violence 
against women, the political representation 
of women, the decriminalisation of prosti-
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ordinates the process of state reporting un-
der CEDAW. This is remarkable, because in 
other developed countries separate women’s 
units or ministries have been abolished or 
downscaled over the years (Curtin & Teght-
soonian, 2010, p. 546).
The research question of this article is 
whether the COs of the CEDAW Commit-
tee have (indeed) had impact and whether 
they have been effective. Impact is under-
stood as the extent to which the government, 
Parliament, courts and NGOs have used 
or referred to CEDAW and the COs of the 
CEDAW Committee in their work. Effective-
ness is defined as a change in policy and/or 
legislation made (partly) as a consequence of 
and with the intention to comply with those 
COs. Consequently, this article studies some 
of the factors and conditions under which 
a CO can be effective (Evan, 1965, p. 288; 
Griffiths, 2003, p. 73-74).
The theoretical starting point of this paper 
is that COs are legally speaking non-binding 
and that the bodies that monitor the imple-
mentation of the human rights treaties (treaty 
bodies) lack instruments to enforce and co-
erce compliance with their recommenda-
tions.4 This means that compliance depends, 
first and foremost, upon the extent to which 
the COs exert a normative compliance pull. 
Crucial for the effectiveness of COs is that 
governments feel bound to comply with the 
COs, even though they are non-binding. This 
compliance pull is contingent on the legitima-
cy, usefulness, persuasiveness and legal qual-
ity of the COs, as well as the authority of the 
Committee (Evan, 1965, p. 288; Franck, 1990; 
Kumm, 2004). Based on these theoretical in-
sights, this paper will rely on the attitudes 
and perceptions of New Zealand Govern-
ment officials of the process of State report-
ing, the Committee and the COs, which were 
gathered through interviews (see below). 
This approach is in line with constructivist 
International Relations theory emphasising 
the views, preferences and identities of indi-
viduals (Risse, Kopp & Sikkink, 1999, p. 270). 
It also echoes sociological approaches to the 
effectiveness of law, such as Griffith’s ‘social 
working of legal rules’ in which the focus is 
also on the importance that actors attach to 
the ’law’, their knowledge about and their in-
terpretation of it (Griffiths, 2003, p. 19).
The second mechanism of compliance 
evolves around the idea of domestic mobili-
sation and the extent to which domestic ac-
tors pick up, discuss and utilise COs to lob-
by and pressure the government (Simmons, 
2009; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999, p. 276). 
This mechanism, grounded in Internation-
al Relations theories, mirrors sociological 
theories that emphasise the domestic social 
context and bottom-up processes (Griffiths, 
2003, p. 23 and 73). Moore’s ‘semi-autono-
mous field’, for example, highlights that ‘law’ 
will not generate social change if it does not 
correspond with the interests and values of 
the people inside the field who are the ones to 
apply or comply with the law (Moore, 1973, p. 
744; Evan, 1965, p. 292). Likewise, Risse et al. 
concluded that compliance with internation-
al norms is higher when they ‘resonate or fit 
with existing collective understandings em-
bedded in domestic institutions and political 
cultures’ (Risse et al. 1999, p. 271).
The methodology for the assessment of the 
effectiveness of COs consists of an analysis 
of the documents in which a reaction to the 
COs is provided, in particular the periodic 
state reports5 and the internal briefings of 
the MWA about CEDAW 2007 (MWA, 2008). 
This document analysis was complemented 
with semi-structured interviews. Interview-
ees were, first of all, asked to give examples 
of effective COs themselves. Secondly, the au-
thor questioned the interviewees about policy 
and legislative changes and measures that in 
his view could have been potentially (partly) 
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influenced or caused by COs.6 Because of 
space restrictions, this article will only dis-
cuss the most cited example, the introduction 
of paid parental leave, more in-depth as an il-
lustration. Around 60 interviews were held 
with government officials, Ministers, NGO 
representatives and representatives from the 
New Zealand Human Rights Commission 
(NZHRC).7 Out of these, three former Min-
isters of Women’s Affairs, five government 
officials, five NGO representatives and two 
NZHRC officials were directly involved in the 
process of state reporting under CEDAW.
The structure of the article is as follows. 
The first section will discuss the impact of 
the process of state reporting in New Zea-
land. After examining the effectiveness of 
the COs in the second section, the third sec-
tion will address the factors determining the 
(in)effectiveness of the COs.
Domestic impact of and attention paid to the 
COs
Government8
The COs of the CEDAW Committee have 
hardly played a role in the government bu-
reaucracy and in the legislative process. The 
government has, for example, not adopted 
any follow-up strategy or plan subsequent 
to the COs, as has been done for the COs 
of the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC Committee).9 The MWA has un-
dertaken an assessment in consultation with 
other departments whether (new) action is 
required in response to COs.10 In addition to 
this, there have, however, been few instances 
during which the members of government 
referred to the COs or the CEDAW Commit-
tee. One exception is the Minister of Wom-
en’s Affairs Dalziel who quoted the COs 2003 
and held that the women in armed forces 
The House of Parliament, the beehive.  Source: Jasper Krommendijk
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amendment Bill is ‘doing precisely what we 
were asked to do’ by the CEDAW Committee 
(NZPD, 2007a, p. 8678).
More in general, the role of CEDAW in 
the policy and legislative process is limited as 
well. MWA officials even admitted that they 
tend not to use CEDAW, because they con-
sider the argument that something should be 
done because of CEDAW not effective. Sever-
al former Ministers of Women’s Affairs stated 
that they had never seen a reference in a poli-
cy statements or internal briefings that some-
thing would contravene CEDAW. The role and 
knowledge of CEDAW in other departments 
was considered even less or nonexistent. For 
Cabinet Papers with policy or legislative pro-
posals there is an obligation to consider the 
gender impact of policy and legislative pro-
posals. Officials acknowledged that these 
statements do not have any impact in practice 
and that they are often of poor quality and 
rather pro forma (see also Hyman, 2010, p. 39; 
Curtin & Teghtsoonian, 2010, p. 562).
It seems that the importance of CEDAW 
has especially diminished since the turn 
of the Millennium.11 Government officials 
and NGO representatives made clear that 
CEDAW is not a driver for policy thinking 
anymore as it was 25 years ago.12 Back then, 
the ratification of CEDAW by New Zealand 
and the establishment of the MWA in the 
same year (1984) were closely related. Sever-
al interviewees argued that in the beginning 
days of the MWA, CEDAW and the process of 
reporting were used more frequently to cre-
ate a real commitment around women’s is-
sues and to give a stronger mandate and legit-
imacy for the existence of the MWA. CEDAW 
helped ‘lend legitimacy to political demands’ 
to tackle gender discrimination (Simmonds, 
2008, p. 244; Aimers, 2011, p. 307).13 CEDAW 
seems to have received even less attention 
since the turn of the millennium. This is il-
lustrated by the lower attention to CEDAW 
in annual reports of the MWA since 2005.14 
In addition, the Action Plan for New Zea-
land Women 2004 only mentioned CEDAW 
in a rather general and superficial way, while 
the COs 2003 were only explicitly mentioned 
once in relation to the need to achieve work-
life balance (MWA, 2004, 1pp. 3 and 25). One 
factor that might have contributed to the di-
minishing role of CEDAW is the organisa-
tional change of the MWA in 2003 (see sec-
tion 3.1).
Parliament
Parliament is not involved in the process of 
reporting by the Government. State reports 
and COs are not sent to or tabled in Parlia-
ment for discussion. The government consid-
ers the periodic reports to be Government 
reports that do not require the approval of 
Parliament. Despite this, COs have occasion-
ally been referred to. Individual MPs picked 
up on and mentioned CEDAW’s COs on five 
occasions since 2000 in relation to the with-
drawal of the reservation concerning wom-
en in armed forces (4) and the withdrawal of 
the reservation with respect to paid parental 
leave. There were another six references to 
the state report or the process of reporting. 
In addition, CEDAW itself was referred to 
only 7 times in this twelve years period. The 
low level of references to CEDAW correlates 
with the findings of a study of 2006, which 
found that MPs made fewer explicit claims 
about women’s policies and interests from 
2000-2005 (Grey, 2006).
Noteworthy is that some MPs referred to 
the CEDAW Committee with disapproval. 
While supporting the Women in armed forc-
es amendment Bill itself, Mapp (National) 
was, nonetheless, highly critical of attrib-
uting the reason for the Bill to the CEDAW 
Committee:
I can understand that this [Labour] Govern-
ment quakes at the thought of an adverse 
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Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women report. I guess that 
the Government spends all its time making 
sure that it is compliant with every little 
UN committee, tinpot or otherwise, so as 
not to get an adverse rating. I wonder what 
the public of New Zealand would say if the 
Government spent all of its time worry-
ing about the UN (…). For the Government 
to suggest that the bill (…) has to be done 
for the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women is simply a 
falsehood (NZPD, 2007b).
National courts and legal practice
CEDAW, let alone the COs, hardly play a 
role in legal practice, if at all. There are only 
a handful of judgments in which CEDAW is 
cited. Most of them merely referred to the 
(preamble of the) CEDAW in general terms 
among several other international standards 
in relation to equality and discrimination. 
Only sporadically is a specific article men-
tioned, and only shortly (CEDAW, 2012a, 
para. 2B).15 The CEDAW Committee has not 
been referred to at all (Allan, Huscroft & 
Lynch, 2007).
NGOs
The NGOs that have been involved in the 
process of reporting are three umbrella or-
ganisations representing women of European 
descent (National Council of Women of New 
Zealand (NCWNZ)), Maori (Maori Women’s 
Welfare League (MWWL)) and Pacific wom-
en (PACIFICA). The most comprehensive 
shadow report is drafted by the NCWNZ by 
way of an extensive consultation process of 
different NGOs, women’s groups and other 
women’s rights proponents.
Especially since the 2002 fourth state 
report, the MWA has broadly consulted 
NGOs.16 The government even provided fi-
nancial assistance for NGOs to attend or ad-
dress the CEDAW Committee. In the view 
of the MWA, this wide consultation with 
workshops in the context of the prepara-
tion of the fourth report facilitated a ‘formal 
partnership’ (CEDAW, 2003a, para. 55). The 
consultation in relation to the sixth report in 
2006 was less extensive, because NGOs and 
women groups themselves made clear that 
they felt ‘over consulted’ (CEDAW, 2006, p. 
92-94). In October 2004 a Caucus of Inter-
national Women’s Issues was established on 
the initiative of the Minister of Women’s Af-
fairs, Ruth Dyson. This caucus meets twice 
a year and serves as a forum for government 
agencies and NGOs to ‘work collaboratively 
on international issues’ and ‘to enhance New 
Zealand’s capacity to participate in and con-
tribute to international fora arising from the 
institutions and instruments of the United 
Nations relevant to the interests of women’ 
(MWA, 2012). The Caucus discussed the COs 
2007 and the draft of the 2010 seventh report 
(CEDAW, 2010, p. 75 and p. 77-80).
The COs have been used less frequently as 
a lobby tool than, for example, the COs of the 
CRC Committee. The MWWL has, for exam-
ple, primarily used the process of reporting 
under CEDAW to obtain recognition of the 
plight of Maori women and their involvement 
at all levels of governmental decision making 
as well as the establishment of a Ministry for 
Maori Women’s Affairs. Because of this, the 
MWWL has not so much concentrated on the 
specific articles of CEDAW or individual COs 
in their shadow reports and wider involve-
ment in the process of state reporting. The 
latter holds true for the NCWNZ as well. An 
illustration of this is that the shadow report 
of 2006 does not address the COs 2003. The 
limited lobbying on the basis of CEDAW and 
the COs is also visible in the rather low num-
ber of references to the COs and CEDAW in 
Parliament (section 1.2).
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An explanation for the minimal advo-
cacy is that pressure, lobby and advocacy 
by NGOs is not the way the relationship be-
tween NGOs and the government is working, 
according to government officials and NGOs. 
Grey also noted that there is hardly any no-
ticeable external pressure on the government 
concerning women’s issues (Grey, 2006). In-
terestingly, several NGO representatives 
showed restraint in ferociously criticising 
government or openly advocating something. 
Rather, the relationship is framed in terms of 
‘partnership’. The government, for example, 
stressed its collaboration with NGOs and 
women’s community groups as ‘partners’ in 
relation to the delivery of social services to 
communities at the local level.17
A more structural explanation is that the 
women’s movement has become more frag-
mented, inactive and less visible since the 
1990s (Curtin & Teghtsoonian, 2010, p. 564). 
Grey argued that the movement is in abey-
ance (Grey, 2006, p. 11). Curtin even stated 
that such a movement has maybe even disap-
peared (Curtin, 2008, p. 501). The Minister of 
Women’s Affairs, Dyson, also stated that the 
older generation of women, of which she con-
sidered herself to be part, had felt that con-
stant improvements in the position of women 
were needed in order to implement CEDAW. 
She considered that the younger generation 
is less committed to and outspoken about 
this goal (CEDAW, 2007b, para. 67). This was 
also mentioned by several government offi-
cials and NGO representatives, who also felt 
that younger women are hardly aware of and 
lobby less on the basis of CEDAW.
Assessing the effectiveness of COs
The methodology for the examination of the 
effectiveness of COs was sketched in the in-
troduction. Generally speaking, measures 
are not taken as a result of COs. This is, first 
of all, because the concerns and recommen-
dations of the CEDAW Committee often 
coincide with existing policy and legislative 
measures. The internal MWA briefing men-
tioned that 38 of the 49 COs 2007 required 
no additional work because there was al-
ready ‘work under way’. Secondly, other COs 
were dismissed or not acted upon, because 
they were ‘likely to be difficult to respond’ 
or because ‘the intervention proposed by the 
Committee is not preferred by New Zealand’. 
It was decided not to take further action at 
that point in the light of ‘a lateral approach 
[that] may be taken to respond’ to the COs 
(MWA, 2008, paras. 14-16). There were seven 
COs that ‘may require additional work’, but 
the only concrete action that was eventually 
taken was the review of the website of MWA 
and other communication media with a view 
of posting more information about CEDAW 
(MWA, 2008, paras 8-13).
The most cited example of an effective CO 
was the introduction of paid parental leave. 
The CEDAW Committee has consistently 
recommended the withdrawal of reservations 
and has particularly mentioned the absence 
of paid parental leave and the reservations 
in relation to article 11, para. 2 (b) CEDAW. 
The Parental Leave and Employment Protec-
tion (Paid Parental Leave) Amendment Act 
was eventually enacted on 30 March 2002 
and included a government-funded scheme of 
twelve weeks of paid leave for women or their 
partners (CEDAW, 2003b, para. 16). Minis-
ter of Women’s Affairs, Dyson, stated dur-
ing the launch of the fifth periodic state re-
port in December 2002 in New Zealand that 
she was proud to tell the Committee in July 
the following year that ‘we have introduced 
paid parental leave, following serious concern 
from CEDAW about the government’s lack of 
action throughout the 1990s’ (Dyson, 2002). 
Nonetheless, as was also argued by the inter-
viewees, the COs hardly played a role in the 
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eventual decision. The introduction of paid 
parental leave was primarily the result of 
domestic imperatives. The issue had already 
been advocated for since the 1980s by female 
MPs and women’s organisations.18 Decisive 
was the idea that New Zealand was behind 
other advanced industrialised countries. The 
interviewees noted that paid parental leave 
was a highly politicised issue that was direct-
ly taken up at the Ministerial level and led to 
considerable hefty discussions between the 
Minister of Women’s Affairs and the Minister 
of Finance. Although CEDAW did not drive 
it, some held that CEDAW and ILO 186 were 
used to build up the case as a tool to explain 
that it is mainstream and internationally rec-
ognised. CEDAW, thus, gave a rationale or an 
element of credibility in the debate.
For the other potentially effective COs 
identified in interviews and document analy-
sis it was also found that COs have not neces-
sarily driven or influenced policy change as 
such, although they were sometimes used to 
support or strengthen policy arguments. The 
MWA has, for example, used the COs recom-
mending a withdrawal of the reservation in 
relation to women in armed forces as a lever 
in Cabinet meetings and discussions with the 
Minister of Defence. COs could, thus, help to 
push other departments. COs have also been 
used by the MWA in a budget bid for funding 
in the case of violence against women.
Nonetheless, several other legislative and 
policy advances for women were not con-
nected to CEDAW’s COs at all. This is true 
for the amendment to the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 which applied the same 
property division regime to de facto rela-
tionships (including same sex) as to mar-
ried couples as recommended in CEDAW 
COs 1998 (CEDAW, 2002, p. 147-148). This 
issue was not framed in terms of women’s 
rights, but ‘fairness’ (Wilson, 2000). Curtin 
also concluded that several policy initiatives 
that had a positive impact on women, such 
as the Employment Relations Act 2000 and 
the increase of the minimum wage, were 
not framed as promoting women’s interests 
in policy statements (Curtin, 2008, p. 500). 
Rather, the issue was approached in terms 
of economic interdependence of women and 
their contribution to economic growth (Hy-
man, 2010, p. 39-40; Curtin & Teghtsoonian, 
2010, p. 564).
This discussion illustrates that COs are 
hardly influencing the content and direction 
of policy and legislative changes. COs are, 
thus, not sufficient on their own. Often a lot 
of other factors are necessary. COs can ac-
celerate a process that would otherwise take 
place as well. It is not surprising that both 
government officials and NGO representa-
tives sought the impact of the process of state 
reporting above all in its positive effects on 
the relations between NGOs and MWA (sec-
tion 1.4). The process of reporting has also 
supported and informed the work of NGOs. 
NGOs have seen it as a recognition of their 
demands, in the case of the MWWL. It has 
also provided NGOs with networking con-
nections and collaboration opportunities.
Explaining the (in)effectiveness of COs
Factors related to the state context
One important explanation for the limited 
effectiveness of many of the COs is the ab-
sence of domestic mobilisation and the invis-
ibility of COs, as was outlined in the previ-
ous section. Because Parliament, NGOs and 
the media hardly pay attention to or lobby on 
the basis of the COs, the Government can get 
away with almost doing nothing addition-
al. One reason for the limited mobilisation 
is the limited knowledge and awareness of 
Members of Parliament, NGOs, judges and 
government officials with CEDAW and the 
CEDAW Committee.
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The environment in which the Govern-
ment and especially the MWA operated in 
the last two decades was difficult and not 
conducive to change. One government of-
ficial made clear that policy change in rela-
tion to women’s issues was hard won and of-
ten dependent upon strategic alliances with 
other government departments. This is also 
illustrated by the long time lapse between 
the Platform for Action adopted during the 
fourth World Conference on Women in Bei-
jing in 1995 and the eventual adoption of the 
2004 Action Plan for Women by Cabinet. 
One explanation for this is the delicate posi-
tion of MWA and the constant threat of its 
dismantling, which leads to a continuous 
pressure to make sure that the MWA will 
keep on existing. An example of this is the 
statement of the leader of the National oppo-
sition party in 2003 that he did not see the 
necessity of a separate Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs anymore and that he would not ap-
point a spokesperson for women’s affairs 
(Curtin, 2008, p. 501).19
The MWA had especially been in dif-
ficult times since the turn of the Millen-
nium. A critical review by the State Ser-
vices Commission of MWA’s performance 
in 2003 pointed to considerable challenges 
to leadership, which undermined the cred-
ibility and reputation of the MWA. In ad-
dition, the review found that the MWA did 
not have a clear focus because it combined 
advocacy and policy advice. Hyman also 
pointed to the turnover of staff, which was 
very rapid with experienced and feminist 
staff leaving the organisation (Hyman, 2010, 
p. 33 and pp. 37-38; Curtin & Teghtsoonian, 
2010, p. 562). The position of the MWA was 
strengthened as a result of the review, but 
MWA’s approach has subsequently become 
less idealistic and activist and more focused 
on policy advice. Since 2003, the MWA has 
‘operated more and more as a mainstream 
agency, rather than as an agent of feminism 
within the state’.20 There was also a change 
in leadership in the same period. CEO Law-
rence resigned in March 2003, shortly before 
the dialogue with CEDAW 2003. A new CEO, 
Gleisner, took only office in February 2004. 
It is not surprising that – as officials admit-
ted – the momentum was not kept after the 
COs 2003 and that these organisational dif-
ficulties contributed to the limited effective-
ness of the COs 2003.
It is interesting to compare the impact 
and effectiveness of the COs of the CEDAW 
and CRC Committee in the light of this fac-
tor. One interviewee argued that CEDAW 
was not used as a dynamic instrument for 
the development of policy in contrast to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
which was used more frequently as a driver 
for policy. While the MWA was in a crisis, 
the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MYA) was a 
more dynamic department with more inter-
est in and commitment towards CRC and ad-
dressing the COs. MYA’s staff was dedicat-
ed to work on the issues and CRC and COs 
were used to advance the children’s agenda 
and to secure political support via the UN-
CROC Work Program. In addition, there 
has also been more lobbying on the basis of 
CRC by NGOs and the Children’s Commis-
sioner. CRC and the COs were also deliber-
ately used by NGOs to inform their advo-
cacy and as an awareness, information and 
lobby tool. As a result, several of the COs 
of the CRC Committee led to concrete pol-
icy and legislative measures (Krommendijk, 
2012b). By contrast, the reaction towards the 
CEDAW Committee was more defensive. As 
mentioned before, since 2003, the MWA has 
acted less as an activist department. Interest-
ingly, the MWA itself stated that: ‘We do not 
act as advocates because we have found that 
simply advocating for issues is not an effec-
tive way for a policy agency to influence oth-
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ers to achieve outcomes for women’ (Curtin 
& Teghtsoonian, 2010, p. 561-562).
A second complicating factor is that ar-
guments based on ‘gender as part of a social 
justice paradigm’ have had less impact and 
become less successful since the end of the 
1990s during the Labour government. Mea-
sures that seemed to favour women some-
times have received less public support (Si-
mon-Kumar, 2011, p. 79 and 84; CEDAW, 
2007a, para. 44). This can be attributed to 
the ‘perceived predominance of women’ in 
key positions. Around the turn of the Mil-
lennium, the four major positions in the 
country were held by women: Helen Clark as 
Prime Minister, Silvia Cartwright as Gover-
nor-General, Sian Elias as Chief Justice and 
Margaret Wilson as Attorney-general. This 
fed the belief that women are no longer in 
an underprivileged position (Simon-Kumar, 
2011, p. 84). The Minister of Women’s Af-
fairs, Dalziel, also argued that the perception 
of the populace that ‘women were running 
the country’ had caused a backlash (CEDAW, 
2007a, para. 44). NGOs found that the great 
majority of the 1964 press items about dis-
crimination against women between Janu-
ary 2000 and October 2006 were either re-
futing the existence of such discrimination 
and/or downplaying the need to act. Several 
articles even argued that men are now dis-
criminated against (NCWNZ, 2006, p. 11-12). 
This backlash against feminism and a politi-
cal and public climate hostile to the interests 
of women has also been acknowledged by 
several scholars (Hyman, 2010, p. 39; Cur-
tin & Teghtsoonian, 2010, p. 564-565). Helen 
Clark’s Labour government was, for example, 
characterised by the National party as being 
part of a ‘feminist mafia’ during the elections 
in 2005 (Curtin, 2008, p. 501).
A third explanation for the limited impact 
and effectiveness of CEDAW and the COs 
is the strong belief in New Zealand that the 
country is playing a leading role in the world 
when it comes to women’s rights. There is 
also a strong perception among government 
officials and Ministers that New Zealand is 
already in compliance with CEDAW. The 
logic runs that New Zealand only becomes 
a party to international treaties when exist-
ing domestic legislation, policy and practice 
are in accordance with the respective trea-
ty (CEDAW, 2006, para. 18). The delegation 
stated during the dialogue in 2007 that it was 
now in full compliance with CEDAW, since it 
had withdrawn the last outstanding reserva-
tion (Dalziel, 2007b). The government was of 
the opinion that changes to the legal frame-
work were not necessary after the COs 2003 
in the reporting period between 2003 and 
2006, because it believed the legal framework 
to comply with CEDAW (CEDAW, 2006, p. 
5). What is more, not only the legal frame-
work was considered to be in compliance 
with CEDAW, but also existing policies and 
practices (Dalziel, 2007b). Both ideas have 
led to ‘complacency in a seemingly ideal situ-
ation’, as the CEDAW Committee cautioned 
against (MWA, 2003, p. 3).
View of Wellington, capital of New Zealand. 
Source: Jasper  Krommendijk
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Factors related to the CEDAW Committee
One important reason for the limited effec-
tiveness of the COs is the limited legitimacy 
and persuasiveness of the CEDAW Commit-
tee in the view of Government officials. The 
previously mentioned mechanism of compli-
ance related to the notion of compliance pull 
and persuasion is, thus, absent.
Government officials and other inter-
viewees were even more critical about the 
CEDAW Committee, than of some of the 
other treaty bodies. The dialogue with the 
CEDAW Committee was not found to be 
constructive. Firstly, because the answers 
to a large number of questions had to be an-
swered in a bloc.21 This form of interaction 
which compels the delegation to explain and 
defend was said not to lend itself to construc-
tive advice or help. Secondly, some interview-
ees noted that the CEDAW Committee was 
too confrontational.
Officials also expressed their disappoint-
ment in the inadequate preparation on the 
part of the CEDAW Committee. Almost all 
government officials lamented the (complete) 
lack of understanding of the Committee of 
the structure and social make-up of New 
Zealand’s society and its democratic process, 
with some individual exceptions. Officials 
also found that CEDAW in 1998 and 2003 did 
not seem to understand indigenous issues. 
Some officials also noted the odd and irrele-
vant questions about ‘rural women’ (CEDAW, 
2003b, para. 23 and 26). During CEDAW 
2003 there was a question whether women 
are allowed to own property, which an offi-
cial compared to asking the question wheth-
er there is electricity in the Netherlands.22
There was also a feeling that the COs did 
not appreciate the particular domestic situ-
ation and are, hence, difficult to implement. 
The internal MWA briefing noted that: ‘it is 
disappointing that some of the recommen-
dations do not fully reflect New Zealand’s 
domestic situation’ (MWA, 2008, appendix 
B). NZHRC representatives concurred with 
this view of the MWA and noted that the 
CEDAW COs 2007 were out of sync with re-
ality. There were a couple of odd COs that al-
legedly showed a misunderstanding, such as 
the access to sewage systems ‘in rural and 
remote areas’ (CEDAW, 2007c). Both gov-
ernment officials and NGO representatives 
noted the high influence of NGOs on the 
Committee’s questions and COs. The inter-
nal MWA briefing also stated that ‘some crit-
icism … is unbalanced. In particular, some of 
the criticism gives undue weight to the input 
of non-governmental organisation without 
any supporting evidence’ (MWA, 2008, ap-
pendix B).
Concluding remarks: further generalisability?
It is important to consider whether these 
findings about the limited effectiveness of 
the COs of the CEDAW Committee in New 
Zealand have a more general validity and ex-
tend to other UN human rights treaties as 
well. As was already mentioned, several COs, 
especially those of the CRC Committee, have 
been (partly) effective or have influenced a 
change in policy or legislation (Krommen-
dijk, 2013). This effectiveness cannot be at-
tributed to the presence of a compliance pull 
or a higher quality of the CRC Committee, 
because the interviewees were equally criti-
cal about the quality of the treaty bodies and 
the COs. Crucial for the effectiveness of COs 
are, thus, domestic factors. There was first of 
all a formal follow-up mechanism at the gov-
ernmental level in the form of a CRC Work 
Programme to implement several COs. Sec-
ondly, the COs were used quite extensively 
in the (domestic) lobby of strong NGOs and 
the Children’s Commissioner. The CRC and 
the COs were deliberately used by these ac-
tors to inform their advocacy. This domestic 
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mobilisation has (still) been rather minimal 
for CEDAW and the other UN human rights 
treaties in New Zealand (Krommendijk, 
2013).
Although New Zealand was selected for 
specific reasons, there are indications that the 
findings do not stand alone and are valid for 
other countries as well. Zwingel, for example, 
found that in Finland, CEDAW has seldom 
been directly invoked since its ratification in 
1986, which resulted in the enactment of a 
separate Equality Act. CEDAW subsequent-
ly lost its relevance given its vagueness and 
in the light of the more concrete and legally 
binding EU instruments prescribing more 
specific policies (Zwingel, 2005, p. 311). Zwin-
gel later concluded that there is only a ‘low 
but supportive’ level of international influ-
ences in Western post-industrialised democ-
racies and that policy issues are not framed 
in terms of international obligations under 
CEDAW, even by NGOs (Zwingel, 2012, p. 
125). Other studies also hint at the limited ef-
fectiveness of CEDAW in non-Western (de-
veloping) countries in Sub-Sahara and the 
Pacific (Jivan & Foster, 2009; Banks, 2009).
Several scholars have recently pointed to 
the minor role of CEDAW and the limited ef-
fectiveness of COs in the Netherlands (Janse 
& Tigchelaar, 2010; Van den Brink, 2012; 
Krommendijk, 2012a). Noteworthy is that 
Dutch government officials were sometimes 
even more critical about the usefulness, le-
gitimacy, authority and persuasiveness of the 
process of state reporting and the CEDAW 
Committee than their New Zealand coun-
terparts (Krommendijk, 2012a, p. 503-505). 
Telling is that COs are seen by most gov-
ernment officials as mere opinions (Janse 
& Tigchelaar, 2010, p. 314-315). While New 
Zealand government officials were rather 
positive about the usefulness of compiling a 
state report, this is approached as a necessary 
evil and a burdensome task that has no prac-
tical relevance for the day-to-day function-
ing of the administration in the Netherlands 
(Krommendijk, 2012a, p. 499).
There have, however, been more COs in 
the Netherlands than in New Zealand that 
had an impact and were (partly) effective as 
well.23 This could primarily be explained by 
the slightly higher domestic mobilisation 
in the Netherlands. MPs have referred to 
CEDAW and the COs more frequently. One 
MP even proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, 
an amendment to the Law on Names on the 
points that CEDAW expressed its concerns. 
One explanation for the higher parliamen-
tary attention is that some of the COs and 
the government reaction were tabled in Par-
liament. (Krommendijk, 2012a, p. 492). An-
other explanation is the ‘unique provision’ in 
the Act ratifying CEDAW, which obliges the 
government to send a report to Parliament 
about the implementation of CEDAW in the 
Netherlands every four years (Van den Brink, 
2012). Especially the national reports and in-
depth studies that were conducted at the end 
of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s 
led to heightened domestic attention (Krom-
mendijk, 2012a, p. 493). Besides the more ac-
tive role of Parliament, there is also a rath-
er vocal NGO collective that monitors the 
implementation of CEDAW and (some of) 
the COs of the CEDAW Committee (Dutch 
CEDAW Network). Another NGO, the 
‘Proef processenfonds Clara Wichmann’ took 
several matters to court in order to generate 
jurisprudence about CEDAW. They, for ex-
ample, initiated court proceedings because 
the government was unwilling to address the 
concerns of the CEDAW Committee as to 
the reformed political party, SGP, which ex-
cludes women from membership (until 2006) 
and from being eligible for election. Because 
the NGO invoked the COs, the COs conse-
quently played a role in some of the court 
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judgments with respect to the SGP as well 
(Janse & Tigchelaar, 2010, p. 314).
The effectiveness of several of the COs of 
the CRC Committee in New Zealand and 
some of the COs of the CEDAW Committee 
in the Netherlands show that COs can play 
a role. COs are, however, not sufficient on 
their own. That is to say, there are hardly any 
measures, which were solely taken because 
of COs. COs are often merely one factor in 
larger national discussions and processes. 
COs can assist and empower one side in the 
debate by supporting or strengthening their 
arguments, as happened with the introduc-
tion of paid parental leave in New Zealand 
(section 2). COs can also push and issue or 
accelerate the adoption of measures. One im-
portant precondition for the ‘landing’ of the 
COs is the existence of a political momen-
tum in the form of an ongoing national de-
bate on the issue. In addition, the concerns in 
the COs should already have been voiced by 
and resonate with the activities, interests and 
claims of some domestic actors.
The most likely scenario of COs having ef-
fect is when NGOs highlight issues in their 
shadow reports to the Committees that they 
are already lobbying for domestically, in or-
der to obtain a useful and ‘authoritative’ rec-
ommendation that will give extra strength 
and legitimacy to their claims. They, thus, 
use the process of reporting strategically by 
not only ‘translating’ the COs to the domes-
tic context, but also bringing issues to the 
attention of the Committees. This mecha-
nism corresponds to the ‘boomerang effect’, 
which describes how domestic compliance 
constituencies and NGOs seek international 
support and link up with transnational net-
works to bring pressure on their states from 
the outside. These international linkages al-
low them to gain leverage by strengthening 
their demands (Risse et al. 1999, p. 4 and 237).
The CEDAW Committee is, thus, not 
a significant policy driver, but it can and 
sometimes has been helpful and support-
ive to domestic developments. Nonetheless, 
one would and should expect more from the 
CEDAW Committee. The Committee and 
the state parties should, thus, do everything 
to avoid that the Committee indeed becomes 
‘a little UN Committee’, as suggested by a 
New Zealand MP.
Notes
1 The article will examine the effectiveness of 
the COs since the consideration of the second 
report in January 1994, because the discussion 
of the initial report in 1988 did not result in 
COs. The practice of the adoption of concrete 
recommendations (COs) by Treaty Bodies only 
started in the beginning of the 1990s. This 
article will not specifically discuss the role of 
General Recommendations. Suffice to say that 
the latter have neither been referred to by the 
government and parliament during debates in 
the House of Representatives nor in written and 
oral questions. No references were found during 
a search in the Hansard database (NZPD).
2 They concluded that: ‘some countries are 
highly engaged with the system. They submit 
substantial reports, their NGOs bring 
individual complaints, their newspapers 
and academics publish information on the 
system, etc. With respect to these countries, 
the enforcement system can and does have an 
impact.’ Australia, Canada, South Africa and 
Finland fell into this category out of the twenty 
countries included in the study. 
3 For the MWA reporting on the status of 
women is an essential component of its tasks, 
which means that there is a certain inbuilt 
departmental ‘ownership’. In comparison with 
the state reports for the other UN human rights 
treaties, the reports have been submitted with 
only small delays of a couple of months. As a 
result, the reporting cycle for CEDAW has been 
rather ‘steady’ since the middle of the nineties, 
because New Zealand has reported on a four 
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year basis. Noteworthy is also the consistent 
participation of (associate) Ministers for 
Women’s Affairs as heads of delegation during 
the dialogue with the CEDAW Committee. 
The 2002 report was submitted in October 
2002 with a delay of ‘only’ eight months. For 
the other state reports in 2001-2002 this was: 
CRC (9 months), CERD (21 months), CAT (36 
months), ICCPR (72 months) and ICESCR (74 
months). The CEDAW 2006 and 2010 reports 
had a delay of respectively 2 and 3 months. 
4 Another causal mechanism is the risk of losing 
face, prestige and reputation through the ‘soft 
sanction’ of ‘naming, shaming and faming’. The 
author is of the opinion that this mechanism 
hardly works for COs, since they are little 
known outside a small circle of diplomats and 
government officials (Simmons, 2009, 124-125). 
In addition, it is questionable whether the 
COs for a country like New Zealand, which 
often involve relatively minor human rights 
concerns, are capable of affecting the country’s 
reputation. 
5 The 2002 report to CEDAW started with a 
part in which the COs 1998 were replicated 
and responded to (CEDAW, 2002, 14-24). A 
response to CEDAW COs 2003 and COs 2007 
was given in a table appended to the subsequent 
reports. UN Doc (CEDAW, 2006 and 2010). 
6 In addition to these two questions, interview 
respondents were also asked about their views 
as to the impact of the process of reporting in 
New Zealand and the involvement and use of 
the process and COs by domestic actors. They 
were furthermore asked about their opinion 
as to the quality of the CEDAW Committee, 
the COs and the constructive dialogue. An 
interview checklist was used to ensure that the 
same questions were asked to all interviewees. 
Victoria University, Wellington, has given 
ethical approval for this research. Consent 
forms were used to obtain prior consent of the 
interviewees. 
7 The NZHRC was established in 1977 as an 
independent Crown entity. It advocates and 
promotes respect for human rights in New 
Zealand. The NZHRC has become more active 
in relation to human rights in New Zealand 
as a result of the Human Rights Amendment 
Act 2001, which introduced a statutory duty to 
develop a National Action Plan.
8 Government refers to the all the Ministers 
in the Cabinet and the respective ministries, 
including the MWA. Sometimes the MWA or 
MWA officials are referred to. 
9 For the COs 1999 and 2003 of the CRC 
Committee an UNCROC work programme 
which contained concrete measures in response 
to the COs was developed by the Ministry of 
Youth Affairs and endorsed by the government. 
10 The CEDAW COs 2007 were, for example, 
discussed by MWA with senior government 
officials from other departments and the NGO 
Caucus. The Minister for Women’s Affairs sent 
a letter in April 2008 to other Ministers to 
inform them about the CEDAW COs 2007 and 
the necessity of reporting on the progress in 
2010.
11 An illustration of this is the timeline in 
Focusing on women 2005 that did not mention 
the reports submitted after the second and 
combined third and fourth report of 1994 and 
1998 (Statistics New Zealand, 2005). 
12 An illustration is the lack of mentioning of 
CEDAW, women’s rights or gender in the 
Plan of Action to Prevent People Trafficking 
(2009), although MWA was part of the inter-
agency working group on people trafficking 
(Department of Labour, 2009). 
13 Some interviewees also pointed to the 
membership of the CEDAW Committee of the 
New Zealander Sylvia Cartwright (1993-2000) 
that (might have) contributed to the visibility of 
CEDAW in the 1990s.
14 The annual reports from 2002-2011 were 
searched with ‘CEDAW’: 2002 (21 results), 2003 
(12), 2004, (11), 2005 (3), 2006 (4), 2007 (4), 2008 
(3), 2009 (0), 2010 (7), 2011 (8). www.mwa.govt.
nz/news-and-pubs/publications/annual-reports
15 Ye v Minister of Immigration (2010) 1 NZLR 
104 (Supreme Court), Bullock v Department 
of Corrections (2008) 5 NZELR 379 (Human 
Rights Review Tribunal), Lewis v Talleys 
Fisheries Ltd (2005) NZHRRT 19 (Human 
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Rights Review Tribunal), Lewis v Greene (2004) 
2 ERNZ 55 (Employment Court), Director of 
Human Rights Proceedings v Cropp (2004) 
AP7-SW03 (High Court, Auckland) The 
judgment in Refugee Appeal No 76530 (2010) 
NZRSAA 116, referred to GC 21.
16 According to the Minister of Women’s Affairs, 
the 2002 fourth state report was very different 
from previous ones in terms of process and 
structure. Consultation was wider since a series 
of 22 regional workshops was organised and 
‘particular efforts’ were made to reach out to 
several groups of women, in particular also 
beyond existing NGOs (CEDAW, 2002, 11-12). 
17 The Government funds and works together with 
NGOs ‘as partners’ in the field of, for example, 
family violence, rural women’s access to benefits 
and awareness raising about the existence of 
a cancer screening register, especially among 
Maori and Pacific women (CEDAW, 2007, para. 
28, 31 and 41). 
18 The campaign began in 1984 with the 
ratification of CEDAW. Since 1994, a coalition 
of community and legal organisations, Trade 
Unions and women’s NGOs campaigned for the 
ILO standard of 12 weeks (Skiffington, 1998). 
In 1996, Dianne Yates (Labour) introduced a 
Paid Parental Bill. While outlining Labour’s 
policy in February 1998, Yates referred to 
‘Beijing platform for action and UN agreements’ 
(Skiffington, 1998). The issue was especially put 
on the public and political agenda as a result of 
the Private Member’s Paid Parental Leave Bill 
introduced in September 1998 by Leila Harré 
(Alliance). Although the Bill was defeated, it 
led to significant media attention and public 
support for a paid parental leave scheme 
(Curtin, 1999). The 2002 Act was adopted 
under the Labour/Alliance government, which 
took office in the following year and in which 
Leila Harré was Minister of Women’s Affairs 
and Margaret Wilson was Minister of Labour. 
Hyman also observed that Harré ‘fought 
energetically for feminist policies and was 
key to the introduction of paid parental leave’ 
(Hyman, 2010, 35, Curtin and Teghtsoonian, 
2010, 562).
19 See, for example, the question of Douglas 
(ACT): ‘When will the Minister abolish her 
department; if not, could she outline what 
benefits the department delivers?’ (NZPD, 
2009). 
20 Hyman noted that the MWA has less idealistic 
feminist analysts than in the past years and 
pointed to the claim of CEO Gleisner that 
the turnover of staff has diminished as well. 
Several recent reviews noted the improvements 
in culture and quality of staff. The MWA is 
even considered to be in the ‘top tier of policy 
agencies’ (Hyman, 2010, 33, 37, 42 and 44). 
21 For CEDAW 1998, the questions were answered 
in writing prior to the dialogue, but they needed 
to be read out in order for them to be part of the 
official records. Hence, there was no interaction 
during the morning session (CEDAW, 1998a). 
Note that this was different during the 
subsequent dialogue in 2003.
22 Ms. Gnancadja ‘stressed the need to implement 
practical measures to protect the interests of 
rural women, including their property and 
inheritance rights.’ Ms. Dyson stated in her 
answer that equal rights to property were 
already legally guaranteed (CEDAW, 2003b, 
para. 26 and 33).
23 Besides the SGP case before the courts, 
several policy or legislative measures could 
be attributed, often amongst other factors as 
well, to the COs of the CEDAW Committee, 
including the Working Group Law on Names, 
the evaluation of the gender dimension of the 
asylum policy, exit programmes for prostitutes 
and some steps to move beyond the gender 
neutral formulation policy on domestic 
violence.
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